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REBRANDING PUBLIC NUISANCE: CITY OF
CLEVELAND V AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE
SECURITIES, INC. AS A FAILED RESPONSE TO
ECONOMIC CRISIS
Matthew Saunig+
"Despite attempts by ... courts to rein in this creature, [nuisance], like the
Hydra, has shown a remarkable resistance to such efforts. [It therefore
''
requires] an analysis worthy of Hercules, rather than his predecessors."
The American home foreclosure crisis 2 is "a force that is undermining the
social and economic vitality of . . communities, from which it may take
decades to recover." 3 Mortgage debt increased by eighty percent in the United
States between 2000 and 2006, creating a housing bubble that loomed too large
to continue in perpetuity. 4 After the bubble burst between 2006 and

+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2008, The University of Connecticut. The author wishes to thank Professor George P.
Smith, I, for his expert guidance and encouragement throughout this endeavor. The author
would also like to thank his parents, Edward and Dorothy, for their loving support; his sister,
Saige, for her imagination and humor; and, especially, Danielle and the rest of his friends for
making life significantly less serious.
1. Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
2. Press Release, The U.S. Conference of Mayors, Foreclosure Crisis Adds to Existing
Vacant and Abandoned Property Problems in Cities (June 21, 2008) (on file with author),
available at http://usmayors.org/Pressreleases/uploads/vacantenglish.pdf (reporting that the
majority of American mayors surveyed held a negative outlook about the increasing instances of
foreclosures and abandonments of residences within their cities).
3.

ALAN MALLACH, METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, ADDRESSING

OHIO'S FORECLOSURE CRISIS: TAKING THE NEXT STEPS 5 (2009) (discussing the widespread
effects of the foreclosure crisis in Ohio and cautioning that the various legislative and
administrative measures taken to address the crisis may be insufficient to stabilize Ohio
neighborhoods and reverse the foreclosure trend of recent years).
4. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, 11 ITH CONG., THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY IN CREATING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF

2008, at 12 (Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter STAFF OF H.R. COMM.]; cf Am. Bankers Mortgage
Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1406 nn.l -2, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting the public policies underlying the creation of Freddie Mac and stating that "[t]he
congressional purposes for Freddie Mac are clearly designed to serve the public interest by
increasing the availability of mortgages on housing for low- and moderate-income families and
by promoting nationwide access to mortgages"); John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past,Looking
to the Future: The FairHousing Act at 40, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
145, 146 (2009) (explaining that the provisions of the Fair Housing Act "may [have] increase[d]
the freedom of choice for homebuyers but have not necessarily helped produce integrated
neighborhoods or addressed segregated living patterns").
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5
2008,5 cities across the
country experienced rising home foreclosures. 6 The
ensuing aftermath of these housing foreclosures has left cities scrambling to
find a successful remedy for the skyrocketing costs of foreclosures that have
taken a toll on urban tax bases and residents. 7 During this time, political
pressures abound 8 and individual lawsuits are largely ineffective to achieve
9 the
type of results necessary to preserve economic viability in municipalities.
In an attempt to hold a larger class of lenders responsible for its foreclosure
crisis, the City of Cleveland pursued a novel course of action by asserting that
twenty-one lenders constituted a public nuisance when they created mortgagebacked securities either by bundling subprime loans or by lending funds to
purchase loans.' 0 The City of Cleveland alleged that the "spike in foreclosure

5. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 6 (2009),
availableat http://www.clevelandfed.org/AboutUs/annual-report/2008/2008_AR.pdf (observing
a sharp decline of $4.2 trillion in American home values from late 2006 to late 2008).
6. See Press Release, The U.S. Conference of Mayors, supra note 2 (reporting survey
results showing that seventy-one percent of responsive U.S. cities have experienced an increase in
foreclosed properties); see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 6
(discussing that there have been over 170,000 new foreclosures in Ohio between 2006 and 2008).
7. See Creola Johnson, FightBlight: Cities Sue to HoldLenders Responsiblefor the Rise in
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1172 ("Current legal
remedies were not designed to address the level of foreclosure and abandonment some cities are
now facing and pursuing certain remedies takes too long to prevent irreversible damage to the
surrounding neighborhoods."); see also DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E.
ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 640 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that the foreclosure
crisis has generated "serious concerns" about "renewed abandonment, overcrowding,
homelessness, code violations and demolition of housing").
For example, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has sought to curb foreclosures by exhausting all
bargaining possibilities before allowing foreclosure proceedings to commence.
Peter S.
Goodman, PhiladelphiaGives Struggling Homeowners a Chance to Stay Put, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2009, at Al. Under the Philadelphia approach, a lender may not foreclose on an owneroccupied home until the lender and the homeowner meet "face-to-face" to try to reach a
compromise. Id. The homeowner is given some form of counseling in these meetings, including
legal representation in some instances. Id. These "conciliation conferences" have achieved some
level of success as attempts to keep borrowers in their homes. Id. In fact, hundreds of borrowers
have been able to reach agreements with their lenders that prevent the borrowers-and also the
City-from enduring the costs of foreclosures. Id. Despite the immediate benefit of delaying
foreclosures and keeping people in their homes until final resolution, there is still a fear among
troubled Philadelphia borrowers that the program is only "'postponing the inevitable."' Id.
8. See Christopher Maag, Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders over Subprime Mortgages, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at A9 (quoting the mayor of Cleveland's remark that the lenders would be
"'held accountable for what they've done').
9. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 1198 (explaining that large-scale litigation "cannot stem
the tidal wave of rising foreclosures and abandonment because these proceedings involve a single
lawsuit against an individual lender for a single blighted property").
10. City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516 (N.D.
Ohio 2009). The bundling of subprime loans, or securitization, is the process of grouping similar
assets as interests in a way that allows for investors to buy the interests or the securities backed by
the interests. See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2009). This process encouraged a relaxation of
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activity" it experienced was a foreseeable result of these lending practices."
The City sought damages for costs associated with the foreclosed and
abandoned properties that increasingly plagued its neighborhoods., 2 In
denying Cleveland's public nuisance claim, however, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio declined 13to extend the boundaries of
public nuisance to include such business practices.
14
Some scholars describe nuisance law as the codification of reasonableness.
In City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., the City of
Cleveland alleged a public nuisance,' 5 which is "an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public." 16 A court must balance a public
right against the "utility of conduct"' 17 alleged to be a nuisance in order to
determine whether conduct is reasonable and achieves a result that furthers the
common good. 18 Like any cause of action, the scope of public nuisance is not
underwriting standards that "ran roughshod over the financial industry" and "made the entire
financial system more fragile." Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1311 (2009).
11. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
12. Id.
13. Id.at 536.
14. See George P. Smith II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an HistoricalRevisionist
Theory of ContemporaryEconomic Jurisprudence,74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 664-65 (1995) ("[lIt is
within the crucible of nuisance law that the practical foundations and the tests of reasonableness
and economic efficiency are realized in both their original development and contemporary
application."). Professor Smith notes that "[fthere is a symbiotic, if not an inextricable or
binding, relationship" between nuisance law and economic reasonableness. Id. at 665. When
weighing competing courses of action to determine the more reasonable of the two, courts should
use an economic cost-benefit analysis that seeks to maximize wealth. Id.at 664. The courts-in
lieu of an increasingly irrational populace-are in the best position to define economic
reasonableness and wealth maximization in order to safeguard "the economic underpinnings of
the capitalistic free-market economy." Id.at 739.
15. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l) (1979). By contrast, a private nuisance
is "a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." Id §
821 D. Public and private nuisances may overlap when an interference with a public right could
also constitute a disruption of an individual's use or enjoyment of private land. 1 FOWLER V.
HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS 95-96

(3d ed. 2006) (illustrating a potential area of overlap between public and private nuisance by
discussing vibrations that simultaneously hinder the use of a highway and cause damage to a
privately owned building). The primary distinctions between public and private nuisance are the
number of people affected and the interest allegedly harmed by the nuisance-like activity. See id.
at 91, 96.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828. The Second Restatement of Torts lists
several factors used to calculate the utility of particular conduct: (1) "the social value that the law
attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct"; (2) "the suitability of the conduct to the character
of the locality"; and (3) "the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion." Id.
18. See Smith, supra note 14, at 663-64. The Second Restatement of Torts describes the
appropriate analysis for balancing public interference with private utility:
[I]n determining whether the gravity of the interference with the public right outweighs
the utility of the actor's conduct, it is necessary to consider the extent and character of
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of nuisance

law.

Although a detailed economic analysis of mortgage lending is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is important to present a brief, simplified version of the
events that caused the foreclosure crisis because of their inextricable
relationship to Cleveland's public nuisance claim. 20 Defaults on subprime
21
loans are credited as one of the primary causes of the foreclosure crisis.
Subprime lending is a mechanism through which a borrower-who would
normally be unable to obtain mortgages due to poor credit or low income-can
obtain a mortgage for a smaller down payment. 22 These home loans include a
the interference, the social value that the law attaches to it, the character of the locality
involved and the burden of avoiding the harm placed upon members of the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. a.
Professor Smith suggests that the appropriate definition of the common good is an "economic
inter-generational Golden Rule" whereby "the present generation should do unto the next
generation as we would (should) do unto ourselves." Smith, supra note 14, at 675; see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 561 (7th ed. 2007) ("[I]t is to the benefit of
all interest groups that when courts are enforcing common law principles they should concentrate
on trying to increase the aggregate wealth of society by making the principles and case outcomes
efficient."); cf Bernhard Grossfeld & Hansjoerg Heppe, The 2008 Bankruptcy of Literacy--A
Legal Analysis of the Subprime Mortgage Fiasco, 15 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 713, 716 (2009)
(arguing that the law "serves to analyze and correct the orientation of economics that cannot
operate without a value system"). Regardless of the role of economics in constructing the
common good, the desired resolution of a nuisance action-the achievement of the greatest good
for the greatest number of people-is founded in utilitarianism. See John C. Duncan, Jr.,
MulticulturalParticipationin the Public Hearing Process: Some Theoretical, Pragmatical,and
Analeptical Considerations,24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169, 216 n.216 (1999) (explaining that the
common good relates to the utilitarian principle of achieving the "greatest happiness").
19. See discussion infra Part I.B. 1-2 (examining the economic loss doctrine and proximate
cause limits of public nuisance that barred the City of Cleveland from succeeding on its public
nuisance claim against the group of lender-defendants).
20. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Grill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2009) (explaining that the complexity of subprime
contracts hinders healthy competition within the market); Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek,
Complexity and FinancialPanics 24-25 (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 09-17, 2009),
availableat http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/4268 (noting the inherent complexities in the interplay
between the financial market and the institutions that operate therein).
21. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1175. Conceptually, however, the securitization of subprime
loans is generally seen as economically healthy because "[a]s long as borrowers do not default...
risks can be reduced and everyone benefits." FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 5,
at 8.
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 1, 13 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS.]
(examining predatory lending practices and calling for regulatory and legislative initiatives to
combat that widespread practice while still providing affordable loans to low- and moderateincome borrowers); FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 8 ("[S]ubprime
borrowers have blemished credit histories and pose greater repayment risks."). Another factor
contributing to the financial crisis is the rise in variable rate mortgages; such mortgages begin
with manageable monthly payments that can eventually double because of high interest rates.
See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 7 (sharing the experience of Christopher Hall, a Philadelphia
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caveat: they are conditioned on higher interest rates and greater up-front fees.23
The rapid growth of the subprime lending market at the conclusion of the
twentieth century 24 was largely the result of federal initiatives aimed at
encouraging greater low- and moderate-income home ownership. 25 A decline
in home prices, 26 coupled with rising unemployment, 27 left many of these
borrowers incapable of making their mortgage payments and, therefore,
delinquent on their loans. 28 In response, the lending banks were forced to
foreclose on the houses. 29 The relatively small down payments required to

obtain subprime loans provided virtually no incentive for borrowers to
continue making mortgage payments to such an extreme degree that
delinquency and abandonment of the properties seemed sensible.
The City of
3
Cleveland's public nuisance claim arose out of this climate. '
This Note first provides a general overview of nuisance law, focusing on
public nuisance and its various permutations and limitations.
More
resident, whose original monthly payment of $500 on a variable rate mortgage increased to $950
and became an unmanageable burden because he earned only $1000 per week and supported
three children).
23. See U.S. DEP'TOF HOUS., supra note 22, at 13.
24. See id. (observing the growth of the subprime lending market from $35 billion in 1994
to $160 billion in 1999).
25. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM., supra note 4, at 10 (suggesting that government-encouraged
loosening of lending standards created a false reality and a housing bubble that inevitably burst
when low- and moderate-income borrowers could no longer afford their mortgages); see also 12
U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (2006) (stating congressional findings that banks "have continuing and
affirmative obligation[s] to help meet the credit needs of ... local communities"); sources cited
supra note 4 (describing government initiatives to increase home ownership); cf Zywicki &
Adamson, supra note 10, at 2 ("Weighed against the losses of the widespread foreclosure crisis
are the benefits of financial modernization that have accrued to many American families that have
been able to become homeowners who otherwise would not have access to mortgage credit.").
26. Kelly Evans, Home Prices Fall 0.6% as Rate of Decline Slows, WALL ST. J., July 1,
2009, at A2 (noting that in the summer of 2009, home prices were down thirty-three percent from
their pinnacle in 2006). In fact, home prices in Phoenix and Las Vegas have fallen by more than
fifty percent from their peak. Id.
27. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey
(2009), http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data - tool=latest-numbers&seriesid=LNS14000000 (showing an increase in the civilian labor force unemployment rate from 4.4%
in March 2007 to 9.8% in September 2009).
28. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 9 ("The rate of serious
delinquency (payments at least two months past due) for securitized subprime mortgages at least
12 months old more than tripled between 2003 and 2007-to the point that almost one in every
five subprime loans at least a year old was not performing.").
29. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 1177-78 (estimating foreclosures on two million
homes financed by subprime mortgages between 2007 and 2009).
30. Id. at 1178-79. The damage that abandonment caused to these borrowers' credit was
seemingly of little consequence because they had substandard credit to begin with. Id.
31. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 10 (explaining the correlation
between the City of Cleveland's declining population, unemployment, and high foreclosure
rates).
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specifically, this section examines the economic loss doctrine, proximate
cause, and the manner in which both doctrines impose restrictions on
actionable cases. Second, this Note considers the varying degrees of
effectiveness of municipal public nuisance claims brought against the gun
industry to challenge the gun industry's business practices as an unreasonable
interference with a public right. These cases are a point of reference against
which Cleveland's public nuisance claim may be examined. Third, this Note
presents the factual and legal background of the City of Cleveland's case.
Next, this Note examines the rationale of the district court in dismissing the
City's public nuisance claim and the validity of its decision in light of the gun
cases. Finally, this Note concludes by asserting that the district court decided
City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. correctly and that

the decision accurately reflects a proper limitation on the breadth of nuisance
law.
I. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONAL CONTEXT FOR CITY OF CLEVELAND V.
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC.

A. Nuisance Law: Navigating a Fact-Specific Jungle
As Professor William Lloyd Prosser observed, "[t]here is perhaps no more
impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word
'nuisance. ' 32 This is because nuisance law, at its core, amounts to judicial

definition and interpretation of reasonableness. 33 The many permutations of
nuisance law that attach to land use include moral, 34 aesthetic, 35 and
32. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 616 (5th ed.
1984).
33. See Smith, supra note 14, at 701-02 (noting a lack of uniformity among jurisdictions
because "what is reasonable use and enjoyment is incapable of precise definition; for what is a
wrongful interference in one locality... may not be one in another residential locale"); see also
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1320 (2000) (explaining that classifying something as a
nuisance requires balancing the reasonableness of conflicting uses); John G. Culhane & Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a ProperRole for Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits against
Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REv. 287, 313 (2001) (commenting
that public nuisance reinforces society's regulation and management of dangers by imposing
liability when the risk of danger becomes unreasonable).
34. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 268-69 (2001)
(explaining that a moral nuisance cause of action protects a community's standards of morality by
imposing liability for behavior deemed objectionable by a community). For example, the Idaho
legislature has determined that "[a]ny and every place in the state where lewd films are publicly
exhibited as a regular course of business, or possessed for the purpose of such exhibition"
constitutes a moral nuisance. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 52-104(A) (2009).
35. See, e.g., Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Instrumental Value of Beauty in the Pursuit of
Justice, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 451, 468-70 (2006) (discussing the increasing acceptance of aesthetic
nuisance as a cause of action that furthers the common good through the maintenance of
community identities and appearances); see also United States v. County Bd. of Arlington
County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D. Va. 1979) (observing that aesthetic nuisances have been
recognized "in some instances [where] the erection of high buildings or other ugly objects has
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environmental nuisances. 36

Although nuisance law is divided into two

categories-public nuisance and private nuisance37-the
38 scope of this Note is

limited to a thorough consideration of public nuisance.

B. Public Nuisance: A Vehicle to Safeguarda Public Right
The Second Restatement of Torts defines a public nuisance as "an39
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public."

Courts have defined public rights as "the rights of public health, public safety,
public peace, public comfort, and public convenience. ' 4° A public nuisance
includes conduct that is either continuous or causes substantial, far-reaching
effects that the defendant knew or should have known would be a significant
detriment to a public right. 4 1 Due to its protection of a public right, public

nuisance is a valuable mechanism to reinforce and define community values by
imposing liability for conduct that threatens those values.42 For instance,
been prohibited so that a park or a beautiful public building would not be disfigured by the
proximity of such structures"); George P. Smith II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty:
An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 83 (1991) (stating
that an aesthetic nuisance cause of action exemplifies notions of economic efficiency and equity).
36. Ariz. Water Co. v. City of Bisbee, 836 P.2d 389, 391 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (declaring
that the use of effluent waste for fertilization or irrigation purposes without health or
environmental agency approval constituted an environmental nuisance); see also Ronald G.
Aronovsky, Back from the Margins: An Environmental Nuisance Paradigmfor Private Cleanup
Cost Disputes, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 395, 399 (2006) (arguing that an environmental nuisance
cause of action could be an efficacious solution for allocating the costs of environmental clean-up
efforts).
37. See Nagle, supra note 34, at 271 (explaining that a private nuisance occurs when one
person substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of another's land); supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
38. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 60 (2d ed. 1956)
(observing that public nuisance "deserves separate consideration" from private nuisance because
public nuisance protects the general public welfare).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). Public nuisance has also been
described as "a species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights
of the community at large." KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, at 618. The Second Restatement of
Torts also explains that a public nuisance can be statutorily defined and carry a criminal penalty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(b), § 821B cmt. c (describing one instance of
public nuisance as "conduct ... proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation"
and noting the availability of criminal penalties for a public nuisance).
40. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1114 (111.2004). In Beretta,
the Supreme Court of Illinois limited the scope of public nuisance by declining to find a public
right "to be free from the threat of illegal conduct by others." Id. at 1114-15.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B2(c).
42. See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 775 (2001) (highlighting public nuisance as an
effective judicial vehicle to "vindicat[e] community values"); see also DE FUNIAK, supra note 38,
at 70 ("The effectiveness of the interposition of equity and of its injunctive relief to prevent or to
put a stop to [a public nuisance] is readily apparent."); George P. Smith, 11, Re-validating the
Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687, 732 (2005) (noting that an anticipatory
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courts have found that ownership of an apartment building in which
prostitution and drug use were prevalent constituted a public nuisance because
it violated community values. 43 A public nuisance claim may be brought by an
individual person in only very limited cases; usually, a municipality
is best
44
equipped to assert a public nuisance claim on behalf of its citizens.
1. Limiting Nuisance'sBreadth: The Economic Loss Doctrine

The economic loss doctrine bars a nuisance action when a plaintiff seeks
purely monetary damages instead of injunctive relief.45 Many jurisdictions,
46
including Ohio, have adopted this doctrine as a bar on certain tort claims.
Some jurisdictions have created an exception to the economic loss doctrine,
stating that in instances where a plaintiff has not suffered physical harm or loss
of access to property, a public nuisance claim is permitted only when the
plaintiff has suffered a "special pecuniary harm and substantial impairment of
access."47 The purpose of the special pecuniary harm exception is to prevent
the economic loss doctrine from barring recovery in nuisance actions where the
plaintiff suffered judicially recognized special damages.48
In R WP, Inc. v. Fabrizi Trucking & Paving Co., the Court of Appeals of

Ohio applied the traditional economic loss doctrine to preclude the plaintiffs
nuisance action, when correctly undertaken, is one method of protecting society from potentially
great harm).
43. Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 43, 47 (Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the ruling
of a lower court that the landlords' failure to act reasonably in response to illegal activity in an
apartment building constituted a public nuisance).
44. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, at 646. In most circumstances, a government is best
equipped to sue on behalf of its citizens because of policy concerns that a defendant may be
exposed to a "multiplicity of actions" if each citizen were permitted to present a public nuisance
claim. Id. Additionally, resolving public nuisances through litigation is extremely expensive.
See, e.g., Note, A Nuisance Law Approach to the Problem of Housing Abandonment, 85 YALE
L.J. 1130, 1142 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2007)
(reasoning that certain claims involving purely monetary damages are appropriately resolved
through a breach of contract claim). The purpose of this limitation is to differentiate between
remedies that are available for tort claims and those available for breaches of contract. Id.
46. See, e.g., Corporex Dev. & Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Shook, Inc., 835 N.E.2d 701, 704
(Ohio 2005) (characterizing the economic loss rule as precluding recovery on tort claims
involving only monetary loss); see also Ashtabula River Corp. Group II v. Conrail, Inc., 549 F.
Supp. 2d 981, 987 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (reiterating the economic loss rule adopted by the Supreme
Court of Ohio); accord Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Assoc., 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Idaho
1995) (adopting the economic loss doctrine in Idaho); In re Chi. Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265,
274 (111.
1997) (adopting the economic loss doctrine in Illinois). But see Adams v. Star Enter., 51
F.3d 417, 421, 424-25 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that, under Virginia law, a plaintiff may recover
purely economic damages if the plaintiff can show that the defendant caused damage to a public
resource used by the plaintiff).
47. Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 374 (Mass. 1983); accord Neb.
Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Iowa 1984).
48. Neb. Innkeepers, 345 N.W.2d at 130.
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from recovering on their public nuisance claim. 49 In RWP, a car wash business
and other consumer cable subscribers joined to pursue a public nuisance claim
in equity for damages against a trucking company when the company cut
bundled telephone cables, causing a loss of telecommunication services to the
subscribers.
The court rejected this claim under Ohio's acceptance of the
economic loss doctrine, reasoning that because there was no tangible injury to
a plaintiffs person or property, a public nuisance claim could not succeed.5'
When it is appropriately applied, the economic loss doctrine provides an
effective gate-keeping function by filtering out actions that are beyond the
scope of nuisance law.
2. A ChainIs Only as Strong as Its Weakest Link: Proximate Cause
In order to establish standing for a public nuisance claim, a plaintiff must
satisfy the proximate cause requirement by showing that the conduct of the
52
Proximate cause
defendant is not too remote from the damage caused.
generally refers to "the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility for
the consequences of that person's own acts." 53 In other words, if a defendant's
conduct is too far removed from the plaintiffs injury in the chain of causation
to show a direct relationship between the conduct and the plaintiffs harm,
liability does not attach. 54 In a public nuisance claim, the defendant must have
a requisite level of control
over the conduct that constitutes the alleged
55
nuisance to be held liable.

49. RWP, Inc. v. Fabrizi Trucking & Paving Co., No. 87382, 2006 WL 2777159, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2006).
50. Id at*l.
51. Id. at *4 ( "[A] claim of absolute nuisance.. . requires that the plaintiff sustain injury to
property.").
52. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 132 (Conn. 2001) (applying the
remoteness doctrine to bar the plaintiffs' public nuisance claims because the defendant's conduct
was too remote from the harm suffered by the plaintiffs "to confer standing on the plaintiffs to
complain of [those harms]").
53. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (requiring a direct
relationship between the alleged harm and the defendant's conduct in a RICO case). William
Lloyd Prosser and W. Page Keeton explain that the proximate cause inquiry turns on "whether the
conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the defendant should be legally
responsible." KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, at 273. This determination requires a consideration
of legal policy to determine whether a defendant should be held responsible for the plaintiffs
harm. Id (noting that this determination is often a question of whether the defendant is bound by
any duty to the plaintiff).
54. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69; see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
101 (N.Y. 1928) ("[W]rong is defined in terms of the natural or probable, at least when
unintentional."). Proximate cause requires the court to reach a just result by "declin[ing] to trace
a series of events beyond a certain point." Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
55. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 137, 139 (Ill.
App. Ct.
2005).
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In City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co., the City of Chicago brought

a public nuisance suit against lead paint manufacturers alleging that the toxic
paint's prevalence within the city limits was a public nuisance. 56 The City
argued that the manufacturers' continued production and marketing of leadbased paint, even after the hazards of the paint were known, amounted to a
public nuisance because the manufacturers knew or should have known of the
harm caused by the paint. 57 In rejecting the City's claim, the Appellate Court
of Illinois held that the paint was produced decades earlier when its production
was legal, and as a result, the defendant's conduct was too far removed from
the present harm suffered to hold the defendants liable. 58 Due to this lack of
proximate connection, the City failed to satisfy
the proximate cause
59
requirement essential to its public nuisance claim.
C. The Handgun Corollary: The Extent to Which Heavily Regulated Business
PracticesCan Amount to a Public Nuisance

Officials in over thirty cities have sought damages from handgun
manufacturers under a public nuisance theory of liability. 6# An examination of
some of these key cases and the different rationales behind the courts'
decisions provides a valuable framework for considering the extent to which a
regulated activity-specifically, the manufacturing, marketing, and distributing
of a product within an industry-can constitute a public nuisance.
1. Examples of FailedPublic Nuisance Claims: City of Chicago v. Beretta

U.S.A. Corp. and Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.
a. The Chicago Failure:Illustratingthe Limits of the Economic Loss
Doctrineand the Public Right Requirement
In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the City of Chicago sued

handgun manufacturers, dealers, and distributors on behalf of its citizens
alleging a public nuisance caused by the proliferation of criminal firearm use
in the City that constituted unreasonable interference with a public right-the
right to be free from danger to one's person and property. 6 1 The City of
Chicago sought monetary damages to reimburse it for expenses used to
56.

Id. at 128.

57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 139 (explaining that the public policy concerns limiting liability for tortfeasors

under the doctrine of proximate cause also apply to public nuisance actions).
59. Id. at 139-40.
60. See, e.g., David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and
Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (2000) ("The
governmental handgun cases have cast renewed light and interest on the law of public
nuisance."). Professor Kairys observes the mixed results in these cases, but urges that the
handgun cases should nevertheless survive motions to dismiss because the alternative is a
continuing proliferation of gun use that is detrimental to society. Id. at 1186-87.
61. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1105, 1108-09 (Itt. 2004).
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respond to the illegal gun problem.
The City alleged that the defendants'
conduct was "done with the knowledge, if not the intent, that a significant
number of the guns will ultimately find their way into an illegal secondary gun
market and then into hands of persons who cannot legally possess those guns
within the city of Chicago. ' 63 The City asserted that such knowledge and
conduct by 64
the gun industry resulted in an unreasonable interference with a
public right.

The Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the definition and parameters of
public nuisance found in the Second Restatement of Torts65 and limited the
City's public nuisance claim to "the presence and use of the guns within the
city of Chicago" because the defendants' use of their own property to
manufacture guns was not a public nuisance. 66 In assessing whether the City
asserted a viable public right, the court expressed skepticism over whether

freedom from the threat of another's illegal conduct is a public right sufficient
to allege a public nuisance cause of action, as opposed to a private right
incapable of anchoring a public nuisance claim. 67 The court held that no such

public right existed, reasoning that it is necessary to guard against excessive
and "unprecedented expansion
of the concept of public rights" and to limit the
68
scope of public nuisance.
The Chicago court also held that the economic loss doctrine prohibited the

City's claim for monetary damages,6 9 focusing its application of the economic
loss doctrine on the public policy goals of preventing unlimited economic tort
liability. 70 Moreover, the court found no need to differentiate between public
and private nuisances in applying the economic loss doctrine, holding that the

62. Id. at 1109. The City's theory for damages was that the firearm industry's conduct
imposed additional expenses on the City's daily operations. Id
The City also requested
injunctive relief predicated on the claim that, absent an injunction, the alleged harm would
continue. Id.
63. Id. The City's concerns were legitimate because, even though it had enacted strict guncontrol laws, a substantial illegal gun market still existed that fueled high rates of crime within the
city. Id. at 1106-08.
64. Id. at 1109.
65. Id.at 1111 ("The Restatement definitions of public and private nuisance are consistent
with Illinois law."); see also supra notes 39-42 (explaining public nuisance law as promulgated
by the Second Restatement of Torts).
66. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1111 (explaining that although the defendants' conduct on their
own property could not be a nuisance, "neither the use or misuse of land nor the invasion of
property rights of another is required for a public nuisance to be found, [so] plaintiff's theory of
liability is not absolutely foreclosed by the existing common law of public nuisance").
67. Id. at 1114, 1116.
68. Id. at 1116. The court noted public policy concerns in its conclusion that the gun
manufacturers and distributors owed no duty to the general public. Id. at 1126.
69. Id.at 1143.
70. Id. at 1140 ("[A] defendant who could be held liable for every economic effect of its
tortious conduct would face virtually uninsurable risks, far out of proportion to its culpability.").
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doctrine applies equally to both types of nuisance claims. 71 The court
ultimately ruled that because the City of Chicago failed to allege injury to
person or property and instead sought damages for purely economic loss, 72
it
was therefore barred under the economic loss doctrine and lacked standing.
The Chicago court's limitation of public nuisance demonstrates the proper
application
of the economic loss doctrine's bar on purely monetary tort
73
claims.

b. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.: Illustratingthe Limitations of
Proximate Cause
In Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut,

brought a similar public nuisance claim against a gun manufacturer. 74 The
City alleged that it suffered harm in the form of increased costs for law
enforcement, declining property values, a victimized citizenry, and an overall
decrease in public safety and welfare. 75 Although the City's allegations
focused on the destruction caused by firearms in the United States and
Bridgeport,76 the Supreme Court of Connecticut concentrated on the causal
relationship between the gun industry's conduct and the alleged harm to the
City. 77 Responding to the City's broad claims of harm, the court narrowed the
issues it would consider and refused to determine "whether, as a matter of
public policy, handguns ought to be subject to greater controls than those to
which they currently are subject, at either the state or federal level., 78 Rather,
the Ganim court limited the scope of its review to whether the mayor, acting in
his official capacity on behalf of Bridgeport, and the City itself,
possessed
79
standing to bring a claim against gun manufacturers and retailers.
In considering the City's allegations of harm, the court described the
relationship between the proximate cause and standing requirements for public
nuisance claims and stated that its "standing jurisprudence consistently has
embodied the notion that there must be a colorable claim of a direct injury to

71. Id. at 1143.
72. Id. at 1142-43.
73. See, e.g., Culhane & Eggen, supra note 33, at 328 (explaining the fundamental theory
behind the economic loss doctrine as applied to municipal suits). The economic loss doctrine's
application to municipal cases is premised on the idea that, in a public nuisance case, a city fights
on behalf of the public, whereas in a private nuisance case, the city is concerned solely with its
own losses; thus, the city's different roles in these different suits should remain separate. Id.
74. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 113-16 (Conn. 2001) (detailing the
plaintiff's allegations that the gun-retailer defendants knew or should have known that their
handguns were used for criminal activity).
75. Id. at 118.
76. See id at 109-12.
77. See id. at 123-24.
78. Id. at 117.

79.

Id.
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the plaintiff, in an individual or representative capacity." 80 Thus, if the gun
industry's conduct only remotely caused the alleged injury, the City would fail
to satisfy the proximate81 cause requirement and would lack standing to bring its
public nuisance claim.
Addressing proximate cause, the Ganim court examined each link in the
chain of causation to determine the extent of attenuation between the gun
industry's conduct and the alleged harm to the plaintiffs. 82 The court found
that many links in the chain of causation separated the manufacturing of the
guns from their criminal use and that such links in the chain were "strongly
suggestive of remoteness." 83 Moreover, the causal chain was likely severed by
other contributing factors, such as poverty, drug use, illiteracy, and a host of
other urban realities. 84 As a result, Bridgeport's public nuisance claim failed to
satisfy the requisite
level of causal strength, causing its claim to fail due to a
85
lack of standing.
2. The Gun Industry Is Not out of the Woods Yet: City of Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp. and the Acceptance of SimilarPublicNuisance
Theories
The City of Cincinnati asserted a public nuisance claim against the firearm
industry that mirrors, in both form and substance, those claims made by the
Cities of Chicago and Bridgeport. 86 The Supreme Court of Ohio also adopted
the broad definition of public nuisance found in the Second Restatement of
Torts and allowed the City of Cincinnati's claim to fall within the ambit of
public nuisance law, concluding that a public nuisance claim can arise from a
harm caused by a product as long as that harm "unreasonably interferes" with a

80. Id. at 119 (requiring that a direct relationship exist between the plaintiffs' injuries and
the defendants' conduct to establish standing).
81. See id. at 119-20 (highlighting the importance of the proximate cause inquiry as "part of
the judicial task, based on policy considerations, of setting some reasonable limits on the legal
consequences of wrongful conduct").
82. Id. at 123.
83. Id. at 123-24. The court found that the links in the causal chain included the
manufacture of the guns, the lawful sale to distributors, subsequent sale to retailers, subsequent
sale to buyers, the entry of guns into illegal markets, the misuse of guns to perpetrate crime, the
spending of funds by the municipality to combat and treat the crime, and finally, the other alleged
harms. Id.
84. Id. at 124 ("[F]actors other than the defendants' manufacture, advertisement,
distribution and retail sales of guns contribute in significant measure to the various harms claimed
by the plaintiffs.").
85. Id. at 132.
86. See City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ohio 2002)
("[T]he complaint asserts, due to [the gun industry's] intentional and negligent conduct and their
failure to make guns safer, [they] have fostered the criminal misuse of firearms, helped sustain the
illegal firearms market in Cincinnati, and have created a public nuisance.").
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public right.87 The court rejected the defendants' claim that they could not be
liable for a public nuisance because the guns were out of the industry's control
at the time of the alleged injury. 88 Furthermore, the court dismissed the
defendants' argument that the City's claim was precluded by the
comprehensive regulatory scheme that governed the gun industry because the
distribution practices at issue fell outside the scope of any gun industry
regulation. 89 Courts in Indiana 90 and Massachusetts 91 have upheld similar
causes of action where municipalities brought public nuisance claims against
the firearm industry. Through its City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.

decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio joined Indiana and Massachusetts in
recognizing
that the lawful distribution of handguns could constitute a public
92
nuisance.

3. Lessons Learned: Making Sense of the Handgun Cases

Most courts have been reluctant to uphold a municipality's claim of public
nuisance against the firearm industry for its business practices. 93 The question
in these cases-and the question considered in this Note's examination of City
of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc.-is how broadly will
94

public nuisance law be extended to an industry's legal business practices?
Important policy considerations weigh heavily on this question. 95 Expanding
the scope of public nuisance to include legal business practices with
96
unforeseeable results could have administratively untenable implications.
87. Id. at 1142 (noting that public nuisance claims often, but not exclusively, arise from the
use of real property or per se violations).
88. Id. at 1143 (reasoning that although the guns were not in the physical control of the
defendants, the firearm industry controlled its business practices, which facilitated the creation
and support of the illegal gun market).
89. Id.
90. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1231-32 (Ind. 2003)
(concluding that the City stated a cognizable public nuisance claim under Indiana law).
91. City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *14
(Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (holding that the City properly pled a public nuisance claim
against the gun industry under Massachusetts law, despite its unique theory).
92. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1143-44.
93. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 911 (E.D.
Pa. 2000), afjfd, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98,
133-34 (Conn. 2001); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (111.
2004).
94. See Kairys, supranote 60, at 1175.
95. See id. at 1181-82 (identifying the interplay between public nuisance claims and the
role of executive actors in controlling public safety); cf Culhane & Eggen, supra note 33, at 317
(expressing the possibility that certain public nuisance claims could "amount to second-guessing
of legislative choices").
96. See New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 202-03 (App.
Div. 2003) (rejecting a claim of public nuisance against gun manufacturers and predicting that the
court may face an "explosion of litigation" if the scope of public nuisance is expanded). The
court explained:
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Yet, others have posited that nuisance law may provide an appropriate
mechanism to address claims such as these. 9 7 It is within this climate that
Cleveland's novel public nuisance claim against the lenders charged with
precipitating the home foreclosure crisis must be examined to determine
whether it conforms with the basic tenets of public nuisance law.
II. A CITY

IN DIRE STRAITS: CLEVELAND'S SUBPRIME MORTGAGE AND
FORECLOSURE CRISIS PRECIPITATES A PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM

As a result of the housing bubble burst,98 the average price of a home in
Cleveland plummeted by seventy-five percent between 2007 and 2008, 99 and
Cleveland suffered higher foreclosure rates than the rest of the country. 00 Due

One of our concerns in this public nuisance case of first impression is not . . . a
limitless number of private plaintiffs who would likely appear at the courthouse steps
were we to allow this claim to proceed. Rather, we see on the horizon, were we to
expand the reach of the common-law public nuisance tort in the way plaintiff urges, the
outpouring of an unlimited number of theories of public nuisance claims for courts to
resolve and perhaps impose and enforce-some of which will inevitably be exotic and
fanciful, wholly theoretical, baseless, or perhaps even politically motivated and
exploitative.
Id. But see Eric L. Kintner, Bad Apples and Smoking Barrels: Private Actions for Public
Nuisance Against the Gun Industry, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1238 (2005) (asserting that even in
spite of a potential slippery slope for increasing lawsuits against other industries, there is no
public policy concern significant enough to relieve the gun industry of liability for public
nuisance); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making:
Evaluating Climate-ChangeLitigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-SexualAbuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1847 (2008) (suggesting that although gun public
nuisance claims have not met their desired success, they have raised awareness of gun-related
harms and promoted helpful policy debates).
97. See Kairys, supra note 60, at 1186-87 ("If the usual standards governing public
nuisance claims for the last two centuries are applied, the governmental handgun cases should at
least survive motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.").
98. See supra notes 2-6, 20-31 and accompanying text (outlining the underpinnings of the
foreclosure crisis where-through government encouragement-an untenable number of low- to
moderate-income families purchased home mortgages and created a housing bubble that was
destined to burst).
99. MALLACH, supra note 3, at 3. The median sales price for a home in the first half of
2007 was $62,000. Id. By the first half of 2008, the median sales price of a home in Cleveland
had dramatically fallen to $15,500-a 75% decline. Id. By the fall of 2009, Cleveland's home
prices had regressed to 2001 levels. David Streitfeld, Fearsof a New Chill in Home Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, at BI.
100. FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 10 (stating that Cuyahoga
County, which includes Cleveland, experienced a subprime foreclosure rate of 14% by the end of
2008 compared to a rate of 8.8% for foreclosures nationwide); see also Kyle Cutts, Comment,
City on the Brink: The City of ClevelandSues Wall Streetfor PublicNuisance, 58 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2008) (commenting on the severity of the foreclosure crisis in Cleveland and
stating that the city has suffered negative consequences of the crisis more than many other cities).
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brought about by the precipitous decline

in home prices, "the social and economic fabric of neighborhoods [became]
destabilized," imposing many new costs on the municipality. ° 2 The
connection between subprime lending practices and the areas of lower
socioeconomic demographics that were most affected by the sobering
consequences of the burst of the housing bubble is evident; the lower income
neighborhoods ravaged by abandonment and foreclosure
are the precise
03
demographic that lenders targeted with subprime loans.'
Seeking redress from the increased costs caused by the foreclosures, the City
of Cleveland filed a public nuisance claim against twenty-one lenders.' 4 The
City alleged that "the lenders' reckless securitization of subprime loanspackaging them into tradable securities and selling them-resulted in a
widespread foreclosure and abandonment problem." 10 5 Further, Cleveland
asserted that it had endured more particular harms than other cities because of
its general socioeconomic demographics consisting of high poverty rates and
stagnant economic growth. 106 Given this, Cleveland asserted that providing
the subprime loans and packaging them into mortgage-backed securities was a
public nuisance because the socioeconomic nature of the city made the
dramatic increase in foreclosures a reasonably foreseeable result of these
business practices. 1° 7 Accounting for the widespread harm, the City of
Cleveland sought damages for the costs imposed on the city by the foreclosure
crisis, specifically, the city's diminished tax base and the costs of maintaining

101. Robert J. Aalberts, From the Editor-in-Chief"Are Subprime Mortgages a Nuisance to
Society?, 37 REAL EST. L.J. i, ii (2008) (stating that by February 2008, roughly four percent of the
houses in Cleveland had been foreclosed on).
102. MALLACH, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that as a result of the foreclosures, the City's
costs increased, including "more expenditures for policing and firefighting, increased code
enforcement efforts, and more nuisance properties in need of demolition" came to the fore of
Cleveland's fiscal considerations). The damage from the foreclosures in Cleveland snowballed:
foreclosed properties became vacant and abandoned, leading to a lack of upkeep that caused
property damage that, in turn, devalued surrounding properties, resulting in neighborhoods of
abandoned, blighted, and devalued properties. Id.
103. Id. at 4 (observing that the number of foreclosures "cluster-often in neighborhoods
largely populated by people of color-which three and four years ago saw concentrations of
subprime lending"); see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 10
("Researchers have found that foreclosures can have serious spillover effects--decreasing the
values of neighboring houses, incurring costs to governments, and leading to increased crime.").
104. Maag, supra note 8.
105. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1213.
106. City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516 (N.D.
Ohio 2009).
The City claimed that subprime lending in Cleveland was "categorically
inappropriate" because of the city's "high poverty rate, sluggish economy, limited employment
opportunities, and stable but not booming property values." Id.
107. Id.
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and demolishing foreclosed properties that had become blight.'0 8 The City
presented this novel theory of public nuisance to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio in Ameriquest. 0 9
Novelty alone, however, could not overcome significant roadblocks to the
City's claim. State law preemption issues initially precluded the City's suit
from going forward.' 10 Furthermore, the economic loss doctrine, public right,
and proximate cause requirements presented insurmountable obstacles to the
success of Cleveland's attempt to recover damages from the lenders."' For all
these reasons, the court rejected the City's public nuisance claim 112 and, in so
doing, recast the appropriate boundaries of nuisance law by declining to apply
public nuisance liability to lending practices. In effect, the Ameriquest court's
decision prevented a further complication of the already "impenetrable jungle"
of nuisance law." 3

A contrary ruling would have generated more questions

than answers.14
III. CITY OF CLEVELAND V. AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC.:
DEMARCATING AN APPROPRIATE LIMITATION OF PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW

A. State-Law Preemption as an Initial Bar

After the City of Cleveland filed its public nuisance suit, the lenderdefendants initially moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that it was
preempted by state law.' 15 The lenders cited an Ohio statute providing that
108. Id. at 516, 525. The City of Cleveland calculated its claimed damages based on the
costs of responding to property foreclosures and lost tax revenues resulting from "the depreciating
effect foreclosures have had on the affected homes and surrounding properties." Id. at 516.
109. See id. at 515-16; see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 1198 (noting that the Cities of
Cleveland, Buffalo, and Baltimore have all filed "novel large-scale litigation" against lenders that
contributed to the foreclosure crisis).
110. See discussion infra Part III.A.
11.
See discussion infra Parts III.B-D (endorsing the district court decision holding that the
economic loss doctrine, public right requirement, and proximate cause standing requirement each
provide appropriate bars to the City of Cleveland's recovery of foreclosure-related damages from
the lender-defendants).
112. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
113. See supra text accompanying note 32.
114. See, e.g., infra note 158. Presuming, arguendo, that the City of Cleveland's claim had
succeeded, the decision would have created a great influx of litigation requiring resolution of
similar claims made by other cities that would surely flood the courts. Such a decision would
have created a green light for other cities reeling from the foreclosure crisis--even those cities
with more desirable socioeconomic demographics that may not have been harmed as severely as
Cleveland. Courts would be forced to determine what socioeconomic level should serve as a
threshold for colorable claims. Such determinations would be complex and would be a drain on
limited judicial resources. Limiting the breadth of public nuisance at this juncture, as the
Ameriquest court did, resolves this dilemma by providing administrative clarity. See New York
ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 202-03 (App. Div. 2003).
115. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
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state law governed the regulation of banks and lending institutions."

6

Rejecting the City's asserted defense that its public nuisance action was not a
regulatory matter-and thus not subject to the preemption statute-the court
dismissed the City's complaint." 7 Although Cleveland's public nuisance
claim was preempted by state law, the court nevertheless analyzed the
substance of the nuisance claim to explain additional reasons for dismissing the
complaint; in doing so, the court established the proposition that the
unfavorable
lending practices at issue are not within the realm of nuisance
I
law.'

B. The Ameriquest Court'sAdherence to the Economic Loss Doctrine
PreventedRecovery

In its attempt to overcome the economic loss doctrine hurdle-which bars
recovery for a tort-based injury alleging purely economic loss-the City of
Cleveland argued that Ohio did not follow traditional application of the
doctrine in public nuisance cases.1 19 The district court flatly rejected this
contention as a categorical distortion of Ohio law and applied the economic
loss doctrine to the public nuisance claim. 1 20 The City argued in the alternative
that if the economic loss doctrine applied, it did not bar the City's claim
because the City's damages were not solely economic, but were related to
property damage.' 21 The court found this argument unpersuasive because the
City had no recognizable property interest in the foreclosed properties and did
122
not own the properties at the time the foreclosures caused the harm.
Because Cleveland failed to show that it had any property interest that was
116.

Id. at 517; see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.63(A)-(B) (LexisNexis 2009). The Code

states:
Any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or other action by a municipal corporation or
other political subdivision to regulate, directly or indirectly, the origination, granting,
servicing, or collection of loans or other forms of credit constitutes a conflict with the
Revised Code ... and with the uniform operation throughout the state of lending and
other credit provisions, and is preempted.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.63(B).
117. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 518, 520.
118. Id. at 520 ("Even if not preempted by state law, however, the City's claim fails as a
matter of law on several other grounds. The Court turns to the substance of the public nuisance
claim to address these additional bases for dismissal.").
119. Id. at 522.
120. Id. ("[T]he City's contention that Ohio courts do not apply the economic loss doctrine in
public nuisance cases is palpably false, and its direct converse is true."). In ruling on this issue,
the court relied in part on precedent established in RWP, Inc. v. FabriziTrucking & Paving Co.,
No. 87382, 2006 WL 2777159, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2006). See supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text.
121. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 525 ("[T]he City seeks to recover for alleged physical
damage to properties it did not own, but that were owned by someone else-i.e., the homeowners
that went through foreclosure.").
122. Id. at 526.
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injured, the court found that the relief sought was purely economic, and it ruled
that the economic
23 loss doctrine barred recovery under the City's public
nuisance theory.'
The Ameriquest court's holding placed proper limits on the scope of public
nuisance law, and its application of the economic loss doctrine followed the
approaches of other jurisdictions that have barred public nuisance claims
arising from business practices.' 24 By applying the economic loss doctrine to a
public nuisance allegation against lenders in an attempt to recover costs
associated with foreclosures, the district court achieved a consistency with the
doctrine's application in the handgun cases.' 25 The same policy concerns
underlying the doctrine's application in the public nuisance handgun cases also
apply to Ameriquest.126 Restricting liability based on the economic loss
doctrine to exclude purely monetary claims achieves the goal of the doctrinepreventing an overly litigious society where the slightest negative economic
effect of a defendant's conduct would impose upon the defendant liability far
exceeding its proportion of fault.' 27 The Ameriquest court properly applied the
economic loss doctrine's limitation on public nuisance claims and resisted the
City's attempt to subvert the doctrine, based on the undesirable consequences
such subversion would cause.
C. Extensive Regulation Evinces No UnreasonableInterferencewith a Public
Right

Generally, Ohio courts have precluded public nuisance claims when the
alleged nuisance is actually a legally sanctioned activity. 28 Despite this
precedent, Cleveland contended that otherwise legal activity,1 when performed
negligently, gave rise to a cognizable public nuisance claim. 29
The court explained that the City "frame[d] the issue [im]properly" by
failing to distinguish between "lawful" conduct and conduct that is "subject to
regulation and, within the framework of a regulatory scheme, encouraged."' 3 °
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1139-40 (111.
2004).
125. See supraPart I.C.
126. See, e.g., Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1140 (recognizing that the economic loss doctrine
serves as a valuable tool to prevent open-ended tort liability). As in Beretta, the Ameriquest court
found that the economic loss doctrine applied to limit the scope of monetary recovery when no
damage was incurred to a person or property right. See Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
127. Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1140 (noting that liability for minute economic effects would
make most businesses practically uninsurable because of the high risk of nuisance liability).
128. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 526 ("The nebulous and malleable nature of the claim
notwithstanding, Ohio courts have long imposed the following concrete limitation on public
nuisance claims: 'What the law sanctions cannot be held to be a public nuisance."' (quoting Allen
Freight Lines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 595 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ohio 1992))).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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The court held that even if the lender-defendants acted negligently, their
conduct was exempt from public nuisance liability if the conduct complied
with the governing regulatory scheme.1 31 The court noted the extensive federal
impetus behind making home loans available to low- and moderate-income
families 132 and examined whether the regulation of such loans was
comprehensive enough to sanction the defendants' actions and warrant
dismissal of the City's claim.' 33 The court also cited the public policy
concerns that would arise were it to question the "wisdom" of decisions made
by legislatures and officials specifically charged with regulating this
conduct. 134 Ultimately, the court held that the City of Cleveland was
challenging conduct that complied with the applicable regulatory scheme, and
therefore, the claim failed as a matter of law. 135 Without asserting any claims
against conduct not in compliance with the legal regime, the City failed to
prove a public nuisance and thereby provided the court with another basis for
dismissing the suit. 36 The Ameriquest court's refusal to expand the scope of
public rights parallels the City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. court's
refusal to include the right to be free from the threat of illegal conduct within
the protections of public nuisance law. 137 The same policy considerations that
drove the Supreme Court of Illinois' ruling in Beretta apply equally to
Ameriquest.
Expanding the scope of public rights, as urged by the City of Cleveland,
would erode the boundaries of nuisance law that guard against an overly broad
imposition of liability. 39 Further, similar to City of Chicago v. American
CyanamidCo., because the Ameriquest lender-defendants' conduct was legally
sanctioned, even encouraged, when it was commissioned, 140 there is a
persuasive argument that no unreasonable interference with a public right

131. Id. at 527-28.
132. See id. at 529-30; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing
governmental initiatives to increase the availability of mortgages for low- and moderate-income
housing).
133. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 529-30 ("The picture that develops from an overview of
[federal] laws and agency actions is not just one of significant regulation, but of express
governmental encouragement of the type of lending that forms the basis for the City's claim.").
134. Id. at 531.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1114-16 (Ill. 2004)
(explaining that such a right may be an individual right rather than a public right).
138. See id at 1116; see also supra Part I.C. l.a (discussing the policy rationale behind the
Supreme Court of Illinois' decision in Beretta).
139. Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1116. The Beretta court was "reluctant to recognize a public
right so broad and undefined that the presence of any potentially dangerous instrumentality in the
community could be deemed to threaten it." Id.
140. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM., supra note 4, at 2, 5-6 (describing the federal government's
practices to coerce and incentivize mortgage lenders to relax their lending standards).
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occurred. 14 1 The Ameriquest court factored into its analysis the existence of
federal and state statutory regulations with which the lender-defendants
complied, and correctly applied public nuisance jurisprudence to bar the City's
claim. 142 City of Cincinnativ. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. can be distinguished from
Ameriquest because the court in Chicago notably-and wrongly--diluted its

consideration of whether any comprehensive regulatory schemes governed the
defendants' conduct in determining if an unreasonable interference with a
public right occurred. 14 3 A holding to the contrary that dismisses a defendant's
compliance with the regulations governing the conduct at issue rubs against
common sense. The primary purpose of these regulatory schemes would be
negated if activities that fall within their scope could be attacked as public
nuisances. The government's failure to recognize and regulate for potentially
disastrous conduct should not create a back door to relief when a defendant's
conduct otherwise complies with the regulatory scheme.

141. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) ("[T]he
conduct of defendants in promoting and lawfully selling lead-containing pigments decades ago,
which was subsequently lawfully used by others, cannot be a legal cause of plaintiff's
complained-of injury."). The court noted that the presence of "intact lead-based paint" was not
enough to create a "lead hazard" under the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act. Id. at 132 & n.3.
Similarly, because the conduct of the lenders in Ameriquest was sanctioned by federal and state
housing regulations, the City of Cleveland could not maintain a public nuisance claim against the
lenders because it could not prove unreasonable interference with a public right. See Ameriquest,
621 F. Supp. 2d at 531; STAFF OF H.R. COMM., supra note 4, at 2, 5-6.
142. See Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29 (discussing applicable federal and state law).
If the alleged nuisance stems from conduct that is subject to substantial regulation by the state,
then the administrative or legislative forum, rather than the courtroom, is the appropriate venue to
check unscrupulous practices. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products

Liability Tort, U. CN. L. REV. 741, 805-06 (2003) (attributing the reduction in government
public nuisance actions during the "Progressive Era and New Deal" to "the development of
comprehensive statutory and regulatory schemes that substituted other means of regulation for
many former targets of public nuisance prosecutions"); David Schmudde, Responding to the
Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 770

(2009) (calling for "significant new rules" to rebound from the foreclosure crisis and explaining
that the costs of further regulation are reasonable in light of the costs associated with recovering
from the crisis). But cf Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, The "Gift" That Keeps on
Giving: Global Warming Meets the Common Law, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 109, 127 (2008)

(discussing the European Union's failure to comply with established caps on air quality and
emissions and arguing that public nuisance actions should be allowed when there is "no direct
mechanism to provide redress if the regulatory scheme proves inadequate").
143. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002). The
Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged that "a comprehensive regulatory scheme involving the
manufacturing, sales, and distribution of firearms" existed. Id.Nonetheless, it circumvented this
bar by finding that a public nuisance could still exist because the regulatory scheme did not
specifically address the distribution practices of which the City complained. Id.
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D. Tripping over the FinalHurdle: Insufficient Proximate Cause

In Ameriquest, the lender-defendants also asserted that their activities did not
proximately cause the harm alleged by the City. 144 By analyzing the chain of
causation in a fashion similar to that in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,145 the

Ameriquest court found that the connection between the lenders' actions and
the City's alleged harm was too attenuated to satisfy the proximate cause
requirement. 146 Cleveland's public nuisance claim hinged on connecting the
lenders' packaging of subprime loans into mortgage-backed securities to the
city's foreclosure crisis. 147 After examining the specific facts in the case, the
Ameriquest court found that there were many intermediate parties in the causal
chain between the defendants and the property foreclosures. 148 The court also
highlighted that it was "someone-very importantly, not [the lenderdefendants]-[who] foreclosed on the property."' 149 Given the various
intervening and superseding factors that contributed to Cleveland's foreclosure
crisis, the court reasoned that it was impossible for the City to meet the
proximate cause requirement
because deciphering specific shares of liability
50
would be impracticable.1
The attenuated chain of causation in Ameriquest resembles that articulated in
Ganim.151 Indeed, just as there were numerous factors other than the gun
industry's practices that contributed to the alleged gun-related public nuisance
in Ganim, there were several factors other than the lenders' business practices
that led to the high rates of foreclosure in Cleveland.152
Factors
"[c]omplicat[ing] the calculus of attributable damages"--including the housing
bubble burst and rising unemployment rates-prompt the conclusion that the
Ameriquest court correctly denied the City's standing due to a lack of
proximate cause. 153

Additionally, as in Ganim, the Ameriquest court

appropriately refused to disregard established nuisance law in lieu of resolving
144. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (discussing the City's failure to establish proximate
cause when it did not prove a direct link between its injury and the lender-defendants' conduct).
145. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (recounting the causal chain discussed in
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.).
146. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (explaining that the damages for which third
parties-such as borrowers and investors-would be responsible may be virtually inseparable
from the damages attributable to the defendants).
147. Id.at 534.
148. Id. (concluding that the lender-defendants' actions were separated from the City's

damages by a long chain of interceding events).
149.
150.

Id.
Id.at 535 ("Sorting out these contributing factors in an effort to assign liability would be

a speculation-laden, uncertain endeavor.").
151. See Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 129-30 (Conn. 2001).
152. Id. at 124-26; see also supra text accompanying notes 2-6, 20-31 (discussing the
lending practices and contributing factors-such as the burst of the housing bubble-that led to
the foreclosure crisis and to widespread default among subprime borrowers in Cleveland).
153. Ameriquest, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
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a policy debate over methods of coping with the foreclosure crisis and
correcting past wrongs. 54 By ruling that proximate cause was not satisfied in
Ameriquest, the court preserved the sanctity of public nuisance through an
accurate demarcation of its boundaries and limits-a demarcation anchored to
that societal reasonableness is obtained by balancing competing
the principle
55
interests.
IV. CONCLUSION

The limitations imposed on a public nuisance cause of action' 56 provide
necessary legal checks that prevent an impermissible extension of public
nuisance claims to activities that fall outside the scope of public nuisance
law. 157 The lending activities engaged in by the twenty-one lenders in City of
Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. fell outside the reach of
public nuisance, as the law should be correctly applied. Allowing the City of
Cleveland's public nuisance claim to stand-notwithstanding the state-law
preemption issue-would have amounted to a perversion of the traditional law
of public nuisance. 158 Such checks on an unfettered expansion of this cause of
action are necessary to prevent an overly litigious culture in which public
nuisance claims run rampant. 159 Allowing Cleveland's public nuisance claim
to stand would have set the proverbial wheels in motion toward undesirable
results where financial liability would be imposed on businesses for any
154. See id; cf Oren Bar-Grill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 70 (2008) (explaining that there are other judicial mechanisms-such as contract law and
bankruptcy-to protect consumers from unscrupulous lending practices).
155. See Smith, supra note 14, at 699 ("[B]y its reasonable application, [nuisance law] has
sought to effect a responsible, balanced approach[,] ... which seeks to accommodate fundamental
principles of utilitarianism . . . guided as such by a standard of reasonableness effected by
application of a balancing test.").
156. See supra Parts III.B-D (discussing the economic loss doctrine, public right
requirement, and proximate cause requirement as limits on a claim of public nuisance).
157. See Richard E. Gottlieb & Andrew J. McGuinness, Subprime Lending as a Public
Nuisance: Casting Blame on Mortgage Lenders and Wall Street for Inner City Blight, 62
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 5 (2008) (discussing the possibly overwhelming complexities of
determining causation and calculating damages in this type of public nuisance litigation).
158. Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 825, 910 (2004) (cautioning against a distortion of public nuisance law alleged by
government claims). This Note is sympathetic, however, to the political pressures on government
officials to effectuate some retribution against those perceived to be the cause of the foreclosure
problem. See Kermit J. Lind, The Perfect Storm: An Eyewitness Report from Ground Zero in
Cleveland's Neighborhoods, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 237, 253
(2008) (explaining that governments facing steep costs caused by the foreclosure crisis "will be
compelled to seek relief"). But see Gottlieb & McGuinness, supra note 157, at II ("With so
much misery to go around, for cities to seek to single out lenders as additionally liable, not only
for their own losses but the losses of others, as a result of unsuccessful loans, seems blatantly
misguided.").
159. See New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 202-03 (App.
Div. 2003).
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unfavorable action, no matter how minute or attenuated its connection to a
perceived harm.' 60 Although considerable debate surrounds the nature and
breadth of nuisance law,'
the activities complained of by the City of
Cleveland must necessarily fall outside nuisance law's reach. The limitation
endorsed by the Ameriquest court accords with the common law, but, perhaps
more importantly, it is the correct application of the law. This framework will
ensure the continued economic advancement of society' through the careful
imposition of reasonable limits on government public nuisance suits.

160. See Culhane & Eggen, supra note 33, at 329 (cautioning that "the very power of public
nuisance law counsels against its promiscuous use").
161. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 34, at 270-71 (discussing the debate surrounding the
appropriate threshold for a proper cause of action under nuisance law).
162. Limiting the scope of public nuisance to achieve this goal is even more important in an
age where recovery from the economic crisis after the housing bubble burst has been slow to
progress. For example, new home construction in October 2009 was 10.6% less than projected in
September 2009. Joint Release, U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., New
Residential Construction in October 2009 (Nov. 18, 2009) (on file with author), available at
http://www.census.gov/const/newresconst_200910.pdf. The stock market remains volatile and
the value of the dollar is decreasing, meaning foreign-made products will be more expensive for
American consumers. Javier C. Hernandez, As Confident Investors Race to Stocks, the Dollar
Weakens Further,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at B1 (commenting that although the weakening of
the dollar means more expensive foreign products, it may also render American exports more
competitive). This persisting economic uncertainty amplifies the already persuasive policy
considerations supporting the denial of the City of Cleveland's public nuisance claim in
Ameriquest. See supra note 114.

